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ABSTRACT: 
 
The resurgence of the Taliban and the al Qaida are interwoven with the 
rising tide of militancy in the tribal areas of Pakistan. After the Taliban’s 
ouster from Afghanistan, the al Qaida and its supporters regrouped in the 
FATA and launched attacks on the US and NATO troops in Afghanistan. 
Pakistan, a major ally of the US on war upon terror tried to quell the 
insurgents but did not succeed. The cross-border infiltration and attacks on 
US troops continued, causing serious doubts about Pakistan’s sincerity in the 
suppression of the militancy. The present research focuses on these and other 
similar issues including the recent trust deficit between US and Pakistan and 
the essential measures for bringing stability to the region thus ensuring safe 
withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. 
 
 
 
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, popularly known as FATA, 
have garnered much attention in the recent times. Termed by the American President 
Barrack Obama as the ‗most dangerous place on earth‘, the area stretched between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan is known for its peculiar type of tribal society and the 
system of governance retained since centuries. The present system of governance 
was introduced by the British for the furtherance of their colonial designs in the 
South Asia. To thwart the much-feared alleged Russian advances towards India, the 
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British colonial administration planned their penetration in the Pashtoon dominated 
areas, known for inhospitable mountains and passes and wild tribesmen. They faced 
a tough resistance in its occupation and were unable to permanently keep it under 
their rule. The imperialists heavily relied upon the local support and took various 
steps to gain the sympathies of the tribal people to their side. Hence the introduction 
of the Maliki system, followed by the introduction of some unpopular reforms 
including the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). Political, judicial, social and other 
reforms, introduced in other parts of the country have been denied to the people 
living in FATA, reasons counted as the unruly nature of the people. The same 
situation continued even after the transferring of the area from British colonial 
administration to Pakistan in 1947. This provided a chance to al Qaida and other 
similar terrorist organisations to establish their networks in the region disturbing the 
peace and tranquillity of the whole world. Despite the presence of about one hundred 
thousand Pakistani troops in FATA and the daily increasing drone raids, the militants 
are still organising bombing raids inside Pakistan and attacking the US forces and its 
NATO allies in Afghanistan.  
  
Although the issue remained unresolved for many years, it came to the spot 
light recently when one of the top most US military officials accused Pakistan of 
covertly providing all kind of help and logistic support to the Haqqani network of the 
Taliban to attack US and NATO troops inside Afghanistan. Pakistan denied the 
allegations and vituperation from the US official and cited the highest number of 
casualties, both in the civilian and military ranks, which it suffered in combating 
terrorism in the region. As a frontline state, according to the Pakistani officials, it 
suffered more as compared to any other country in the world. More than thirty 
thousand civilians and five thousands security personnel were killed by the terrorists, 
a number much higher than the combined US and NATO casualties in Afghanistan. 
The Pakistan government showed its anguish and anxiety on the US demand to ‗do 
more‘ and showed its incapability in launching another major military operation in 
North Waziristan to flush out the al Qaida and the Taliban supporters from the area. 
The war of words further escalated the already existing tension between the two 
countries and till date the deficit of mutual trust is evident from the statements of 
various parliamentarians and officials on both sides.  
 
Although the main purpose of the present research is to focus on the recently 
announced political reforms for the FATA, it will analyse the problematic procedure 
of its implementation and its repercussions in the tribal region of Pakistan. This 
research will explore answers to some key questions involving the implementation of 
the political reforms in FATA and the issues of how to stop the further escalation of 
the militancy in the region. It will elaborate on the pertinent issues of the complex 
relations between the tribesmen and the Pakistani establishment. It will also discuss 
the reaction of the tribal maliks and other beneficiaries in this regard. Are they happy 
with the extension of political activities in their jurisdiction or considers it as a direct 
challenge to their authority? Are they prepare to abandon the monetary gains which 
they enjoyed for being the close collaborators of the authorities from both sides of 
the Durand Line or will they simply accept it as fait accompli. Will it retain their 
status quo in the tribal society or they will lose all authority in the new set up. All 
these and the like questions will be investigated in the present research. 
 
It is a known fact that the al Qaida, Taliban and their sympathisers are keeping 
a strong hold in the tribal areas of Pakistan. What will be their reaction to the 
introduction of political reforms in the tribal areas of Pakistan? Since most of the al 
Qaida leaders and other bad guys of the world are disowned by their own 
governments they have no other place to go. They will not allow the political parties 
either to create awareness among the tribal population or to establish a network of 
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the political organisations in the tribal belt. Because of the poverty of the people and 
a high rate of illiteracy, this area has been a recruitment base for the militants. The 
present research will also find ways and means to improve the life conditions of the 
poor tribesmen thus enabling to counter the militants in the best possible way. In the 
final part of the present research, after examining the whole issue systematically, the 
author will try to explore the possibilities to overcome the ongoing militancy in the 
area which is tarnishing the image of the country and people and disturbing the 
balance of power in the region thus severely affecting the US relations with Pakistan, 
which indirectly is moving towards creating instability in the region and eventually 
would prove harmful for the exit of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan. 
 
The FATA covers an estimated area of about 27,220 square kilometres. Its 
population, according to the Census Report of 1998, was about three million
2
 but this 
figure has been contested recently by some scholars who put it as more than six 
million people.
3
 For administrative purpose the whole region was divided into seven 
autonomous agencies which included the Khyber (1879), Kurram (1892), South 
Waziristan (1895), North Waziristan (1895), Mohmand (1951), Bajaur (1973), and 
Aurakzai (1973). Malakand, formed as an Agency in 1896, was also initially kept 
under the direct control of the Government of India because it was very important in 
the imperial strategy as then Chitral, Dir, Bajaur and Swat were considered part of 
Malakand. Later on its status was changed and it was placed under the provincial 
administrative setup known as the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). 
There are six comparatively smaller tribal pockets joined together with the six settled 
districts known as the Frontier Regions and which included F. R. Peshawar, F. R. 
Kohat, F. R. Bannu, F. R. Lakki Marwat, F. R. Tank and F. R. Dera Ismail Khan. A 
special official-the Political Agent-is the administrative head of the political agency. 
The political agent wielded unchecked powers in the agency and in actual practice he 
is the most powerful person with unlimited powers assisted by the Assistant Political 
agent, Tehsildar and Naib Tehsildar. The political agents are given huge funds and 
interestingly these funds are not auditable since the colonial days. He uses it as his 
own discretion and a major share of these funds goes to the tribal maliks. The policy 
to control the local population was first introduced in Waziristan by Robert Bruce, 
the Deputy Commissioner of Derajat Division in 1889-1890. The leading maliks 
were selected by him and graded according to the importance of their tribe. They 
were given allowances by the government and were required to supply a number of 
tribesmen to guard the British interest in the area.
4
 This corrupt practice was 
introduced on the pretext of maintaining peace and tranquillity in the area. The 
maliks who enjoys state patronage are called as Lungi (turban) holders and this is 
still of the most sought-after designation in the FATA. After the departure of the 
British from South Asia, the Pakistan Government endorsed all old treaties and pacts 
signed with the tribesmen and ensured that they should enjoy the same facilities 
which were granted to them by the British authorities. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad 
Ali Jinnah, the founder of the new state, personally assured the tribesmen and 
guaranteed the continuation of the allowances they were receiving in the past. He 
also reiterated that ‗Neither my Government nor I have any desire to modify the 
existing arrangements except in consultation with you so long as you remain loyal 
and faithful to Pakistan‘.5 Although no exact number of the Lungi holders is 
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3
 Rahimullah Yusufzai ‚‗Some More Real Changes‘, The News, Islamabad, 16 August 2011. 
4
 Lal Baha, N-WFP Administration Under British Rule 1901-1919 (Islamabad, National 
Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), p.34.   
5
 ‗The Frontier Policy of Pakistan‘, M. A. Jinnah‘s Address to the Tribal Jirga at Government 
House, Peshawar , 17 April 1948, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Speeches and 
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available a careful estimate put their number as much as 40,000. The number of 
Lungi holders varies from agency to agency and in according to the ratio of the 
population. According to an authentic source, South Waziristan has 2300 maliks, 
further divided in 1700 belonging to Mahsud tribe and 600 from the Ahmadzai 
Wazirs; North Waziristan 1600; Orakzai 8,836; Bajaur 7,300; Kurram around 7,000; 
Mohmand 9,833 and Khyber Agency 3568.
6
 It is pertinent to note that in some cases 
the maliks are clever enough and are utilising their position to get maximum benefits 
from both Afghanistan and Pakistan governments. 
 
The area remained isolated for various of reasons. Its inhabitants are 
economically under- developed, the agricultural base is weak due to the nature of the 
land, the shortage of irrigation water channels, non availability of dams and lack of 
modern techniques and mechanisation tools. It is surrounded by extreme poverty, 
with a high proportion of illiteracy and rare industrial enterprises providing 
opportunities for employment to the locals. The reasons counted for the miserable 
life of tribesmen in FATA includes a big number of maternal and child mortality, 
small agricultural holdings, no access to drinking water and few health centres to 
care for the patients. The non-availability of electricity and gas connections and poor 
communication system, is keeping the tribesmen far behind other communities in the 
region. A survey conducted under the FATA Poverty Assessment, has revealed that 
‗…landlessness or ownership of just small areas of land; lack of livestock; little or 
no food; lack of nutritious food; tattered clothing and no shoes; poor quality or 
condition of house; unemployment; high dependency on others for food and income; 
women working to supplement household income; ill health and disability; increased 
risk of conflict; lack of access to public services; lack of influence and 
powerlessness; and belonging to a powerful tribe‘7 are indicators of poverty across 
the FATA. 
 
The strategic location of the area is due to its proximity with Afghanistan 
which further leads to Russia. The British annexation of the Punjab in 1849 also 
provided them an opportunity to become masters of the Frontier region. Apart from 
many other considerations the British wanted a secure Frontier and maintenance of 
law and order in the newly occupied trans-Indus territories. The imperialists 
formulated various policies in this regard including the two famous ‗close border‘ 
and ‗Forward Policy‘. In the first place the British declared their objective as non-
aggression and non-interference in the tribal affairs. Their major concern was to 
guard the border closely and not to annoy the local tribesmen. They made 
agreements with the tribes, insisting upon maintaining friendly relations between the 
British Indian Government and the Frontier tribes. The tribes‘ sympathies were 
gained through a generous grant of subsidies and allowances. But this policy was 
abandoned in favour of another aggressive policy popularly known as the Forward 
Policy. The main reason according to the proponents of this policy was the Russian 
expansion in Central Asia and their rapid advancement towards Afghanistan. To 
thwart the Russian designs towards India, drastic steps were taken including the 
signing of the Durand Agreement (1893) with the Amir of Afghanistan. This 
alarmed the Frontier tribesmen who took it as a direct interference in their affairs and 
reacted sharply to these measures. In 1897, the Frontier uprising started and soon 
engulfed the whole of the Frontier region from Waziristan to Swat. Immediately the 
Government responded by sending more than 70,000 troops who after heavy losses 
                                                                                                                                               
Statements as Governor General of Pakistan 1947-48 (Islamabad, Ministry of Information & 
Broadcasting Directorate of Films & Publications, 1989), p. 239.  
6
 Dawn, Islamabad, 14 June 2011. 
7
 Teepu Mahabat Khan, The Tribal Areas of Pakistan A Contemporary Profile (Lahore, 
Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2008), p. 131.   
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from both sides brought the situation under control.
8
 From the British annexation of 
the Punjab in 1849 to the formation of N-WFP as a separate province in 1901, the 
British Indian government undertook more than sixty expeditions in the tribal areas 
to enforce its authority in the region.
9
 A popular notion about the 1897 rising is that 
it was a religious struggle led by clergy who regarded the British rule as a root cause 
to all evils and who were vigilant since the British entry into the region. Annoyed at 
the British penetration into the Frontier region, the demarcation of the Durand Line, 
the creation of the various political agencies, and British occupation of the Malakand 
and the annexation of Chitral, the indignant tribesmen decided to wage Jihad, a holy 
war against the infidels.
10
 Fatwas (religious decrees) were issued to kill a white man 
and ‗secure certain entry into Paradise‘.11 It started in June 1897 in Tochi Valley 
(Waziristan) and spread to other tribal areas including Kurram, Orakzai, Khyber, 
Mohmand and Malakand. As mentioned earlier, with great difficulty the revolt was 
suppressed and by spring 1898 order was restored.
12
  
 
However, some scholars recently re-interpreted the whole account as not 
simply ‗tribal fanaticism‘ or ‗proto-national‘ consciousness but linked it with lineage 
relations, religious beliefs, economic and social status which according to Robert 
Nichols ‗influenced the nature of individual and clan mobilization at the outbreak of 
resistance and the degree of accommodation and compromise that quickly followed 
during the repression of the revolt‘.13 The nature of the Frontier rising, its rapid 
spread, engulfing the whole tribal areas and population, and the expenses which the 
government had to bore, convinced the colonialists that the whole Frontier policy 
needs re-evaluation.  
 
The Punjab administration was probably over stretched because of the vast 
area of the province and was unable to give proper attention and the area remained 
considerably neglected for decades. Lord Curzon, on his assumption the office as the 
new Viceroy of India in January 1899, found many anomalies in the Punjab‘s 
Government‘s dealing with the Frontier areas. He decided to follow his own way and 
despite the strong opposition of Mackworth Young, the Lieutenant – Governor of the 
Punjab, announced the formation of a new province on 9
th
 November 1901.
14
 The 
new province had five settled districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera 
                                                        
8
 Baha, N-WFP Administration under British Rule, pp. 4-8.  
9
 H. C. Wylly, Tribes of Central Asia From the Black Mountain to Waziristan, (Karachi, 
Royal Book Company, 2006), pp. 485-488. 
10
 Olaf Caroe, The Pathans 550 B.C.— A.D. 1957 (London, MacMillan & Co. Ltd, 1964), 
p.387. 
11
 W. K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan A Study of Political Developments in Central and 
Southern Asia (London, Oxford University Press, 1958), p.191. In 1855, Mr. Temple, then 
Secretary of the Chief Commissioner Punjab commented that ‗Now these tribes are savages 
— noble savages perhaps — and not without tincture of virtue and generosity, but still 
absolutely, barbarians nevertheless….They have nominally a religion, but Muhammadanism, 
as under-stood by them, is no better, or perhaps is actually worse, than the creeds of the 
wildest race on earth. In their eyes the one great commandment is blood for blood, and fire 
and sword for all infidels….They are superstitious and priest-ridden. But the priests are as 
ignorant as they are bigoted, and use their influence simply for preaching crusades against 
un-believers, and inculcate the doctrine of rapine and bloodshed against the defenceless 
people of the plain…‘.Wylly, Tribes of Central Asia, pp. 5-6.   
12
 Caroe, The Pathans, p. 388.  
13
 Robert Nichols ‗Interpreting the ‗Fanatic‘: Colonial Justice and the 1897 Tribal Revolt in 
the North-west Frontier‘ in Charles H. Kennedy, Kathleen Mc Neil, Carl Ernst, David 
Gilmartin (eds.), Pakistan at the Millennium (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 
271-272. 
14
 For more details see Baha, N-WFP Administration under British Rule, pp. 12-31.   
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Ismail Khan and five agencies of South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Malakand, 
Khyber and Kurram. The head of the new province was a Chief Commissioner and 
Agent to the Governor-General, directly responsible to the Government of India. In 
1932, the N-WFP was given the status of a full fledged Governor‘s province and like 
other Governor‘s provinces of British India the Governor replaced the Chief 
Commissioner as the executive head of the province. Under the new Constitution i.e. 
the Government of India Act, 1935, new reforms were introduced in India and the 
executive authority was transferred to the Chief Ministers while the tribal areas 
remained under the Governor who was the direct representative of the Viceroy. The 
same situation continued and till date the tribal areas are under the Governor and 
outside of the jurisdiction of the Chief Minister N-WFP, renamed recently as 
Khyber-Pashtoonkhwa.   
 
Since its separation from Punjab, the areas witnessed some major tribal rising 
involving a huge concentration of the Indian troops. Only in Waziristan, between the 
two world wars, the tribal uprising and its suppression by the British Government 
was regarded by Alan Warren as ‗the most important military events took place in 
the Indian Empire‘. According to him, for the British Empire ‗inter-war insurgencies 
in Ireland, Palestine and Iraq were arguably of greater political significance, but 
from the military point of view the fighting in Waziristan was certainly more 
critical‘.15 The popular resistance against the Raj in Waziristan was led by Mirza Ali 
Khan (1901-1960) popularly known as the Faqir of Ipi
16
. He was a Tori Khel Wazir, 
a well known figure in Tochi Valley, settled in a small village Ipi, in the present Mir 
Ali Tehsil of North Waziristan. He was anti-British and was involved in small scale 
agitations against the government since 1919. In 1936, he launched his movement in 
an organised manner against the British authorities who were accused of unduly 
interfering in their religion Islam and which was intolerable and declared jihad 
                                                        
15
 Alan Warren, Waziristan : The Fair of Ipi and the Indian Army The North-West Frontier 
Revolt of 1936-37 (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2000), p. XXV 
16
 Mirza Ali Khan (also Mirzali Khan) was born in 1901 (in 1897 according to some local 
sources) in Kurta, a small village in Tochi Valley. He belonged to a religious family of 
Bangal Khel clan of the Madda Khel section of Tori Khel Wazir. After his early education in 
his hometown, he moved to Idik and then to Bannu to continue his education. In Bannu he 
came into contact with anti-British organisations including the Khilafatists and Swarajists. In 
1920‘s his family moved from Spalga to Ipi, a small village in Mir Ali. He performed Haj in 
1928. Soon he became an influential religious figure in the area and his simple living earned 
him the name of Faqir of Ipi. Although he participated in some small scale anti-British 
manoeuvres, his name did not appear amongst the prominent anti-British figures. The spring 
of 1936 witnessed turmoil in Bannu which soon engulfed the whole region. The conversion 
and subsequent marriage of a Hindu girl Ram Kaur in March 1936 with Noor Ali Shah, a 
Muslim resident of Jhandi Khel, Bannu sparked off controversies between the two 
communities. According to some accounts Ram Kaur fell in love with Noor Ali Shah and of 
her free will converted to Islam, renamed as Noor Jehan (alias Islam Bibi) and married Noor 
Ali Shah. Her Hindu relatives, including her mother Mensa Devi protested and lodged reports 
accusing Noor Ali Shah of her abduction and forcible conversion. They claimed that Ram 
Kaur was under age and forced for both conversion and marriage, therefore, should be given 
back to her family. The court eventually decided in their favour; the girl was handed over 
back to the family who secretly sent her to Hoshiarpur (India). Noor Ali Shah was arrested 
and imprisoned. This decision stirred the local Muslim population and they showed their 
indignation on both handing over Islam Bibi to her relatives and imprisonment of Noor Ali 
Shah. The Faqir of Ipi took this as a God sent opportunity and organised Pashtoon tribesmen 
against the British Indian Government. He contacted other prominent tribal elders and 
religious figures and started jihad and continued it even after the creation of Pakistan. He 
died on 16 April 1960 and was buried at Gorwek, a remote village in North Waziristan where 
he spent most of his time waging the holy war against Empire.                      
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against the British
17
 and continued it even after the British withdrawal from South 
Asia. 
 
Fazli Wahid (1859-1937), popularly known as the Haji Sahib of Turangzai 
spearheaded the anti-British campaign in the Mohmand and the adjacent tribal areas 
of Pashtoonkhwa.
18
 He succeeded in establishing contacts with the anti-British 
forces outside the Frontier region. During the First World War he mobilised the 
Pashtoon against the British Imperialism but did not succeed in waging a full-
fledged jihad against the colonial power. Hence, most of his activities were confined 
to the Mohmand area,
19
 and therefore, did not attract a large number of people. 
 
 
PAKISTAN AND THE FATA 
 
After the departure of the British from South Asia in 1947, the tribal areas became 
part of Pakistan. The Governor-General of Pakistan assumed responsibility of the 
tribal areas. However, the administrative structure of the British Government was 
retained by the Pakistani establishment. The authorities decided not to alter the status 
of the tribal areas, at least for the time being. Therefore, the people of the tribal areas 
were left undisturbed, but at the mercy of the tribal leaders. Despite a demand from 
some quarters to merge the tribal areas with the main Pashtoon dominated areas of 
the province
20
, the Pakistan government was reluctant to change its status. They 
decided not to coerce the tribesmen to agree to their conditions and the matter was 
left unresolved, although they knew that this kind of arrangement is a temporary one. 
The only major step was the withdrawal of troops from the advanced positions in the 
tribal territory. In November 1947, the tribesmen on their part affirmed their loyalty 
and support to Pakistan through open jirgas organised by Sir George Cunningham, 
the Governor of the N-WFP. ‗To many‘, according to Akbar S. Ahmed ‗in an 
increasingly different post-independence world, the inherited structure appeared 
                                                        
17
 Mohammad Nawaz Khan, Firangi Raj aur Ghairatmand Musalman (Urdu) (Gorwek 
Markaz, North Waziristan, 2000), pp. 183-190. For more details see Fazlur Rehman, Battal-i-
Hurriyat Faqir of Ipi (Urdu) (Lahore, Institute of Pakistan Studies, 2004)    
1818
 Fazli Wahid was born in 1859 in Turangzai, Charsadda (Pashtoonkhwa). After his early 
education at his native village, he came to Peshawar and continued his education. He became 
a disciple of Najamud Din, the Hadda Maulvi, an anti-British figure in Jalalabad, 
Afghanistan. After spending some time with his spiritual guide at Hadda, he went to Deoband 
(India) and joined a group of anti-British Muslim scholars including Rashid Ahmad Gangohi 
and Mohammad Qasim Nanotawi to perform Haj. On his way back home, he launched a 
social reform movement. In this connection he travelled far and wide and tried to convince 
the people of the importance of the education. His other targets were prevention of lavish 
spending on certain social events including marriages, deaths and other functions. He advised 
people to follow Sharia and avoid un-Islamic practices. In this connection he established a 
Madrassa near Umarzai, followed by other Madaris in the Peshawar Valley. He extended his 
social reform movement also to the tribal areas particularly the Mohmand territory. He 
started preaching jihad against the British Empire. This earned him the wrath of the 
government. The provincial authorities decided to arrest him but he dodged the police and 
sneaked into the tribal territory arriving in Buner in July 1915. He could not stay longer at 
Buner because the local chiefs were not sympathetic to his cause. He moved to Mohmand 
area, permanently settled there, and continued his jihad against the British till his death in 
December 1937. Altaf Qadir, Reform and Resistance in Colonial India: A Survey of Haji 
Sahib’s Turangzai’s Movement in the North-West Frontier (Saarbrucken (Germany) VDM 
Verlag Dr. Muller GmbH & Co. KG, 2010), pp. 64-68.                 
19
 Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, Sarhad aur Jaddo Jehadi Azadi (Urdu), (Karachi, Nafees Academy, 
1989), p. 230.   
20
 Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-
West Frontier Province 1937-47, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 221.  
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alien and out of tune with the times‘.21 The Central Government could not remain 
indifferent for a long time. Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah visited the N-WFP in April 1948. 
On that occasion he also met tribal representatives and Maliks. In his formal address 
to the tribal jirga (assembly of elders) at the Government House, Peshawar, he made 
it clear that ‗Pakistan has no desire to unduly interfere with your internal freedom. 
On the contrary, Pakistan wants to help you and make you, as far as it lies in our 
power, self-reliant and self-sufficient and help in your educational, social and 
economic uplift, and not be left as you are dependent on annual doles, as has been 
the practice hitherto which meant that at the end of the year you were no better off 
than beggars asking for allowances, if possible a little more. We want to put you on 
your legs as self-respecting citizens who have the opportunities of fully developing 
and producing what is best in you and your land‘.22 However, in the same speech 
Jinnah ensured them the continuation of the allowances they were getting during the 
British rule and said ‗You have also expressed your desire that the benefits, such as 
your allowances and khassadari, that you have had in the past and are receiving, 
should continue. Neither my Government nor I have any desire to modify the 
existing arrangements except in consultation with you so long as you remain loyal 
and faithful to Pakistan‘.23                  
              
After the death of M. A. Jinnah in September 1948, the successive Pakistani 
regimes did not change the policy regarding the tribal areas and the legacy of the 
British Raj continued in practice. No fundamental change was seen in the 
government policies and the administrative structure and the political hierarchy 
remained unabated. The Government of Pakistan preferred to deal with the tribal 
leaders through the political agents rather than to contact the tribesmen directly at the 
grass-root level and the old system of allowances continued as before.
24
 
 
The same situation continued for the next decades. The maliks representing 
the local population enjoyed their former status and no political, legislative or 
electoral reforms were introduced in FATA. The Political Parties Act of 1962 was 
denied to FATA simply because the Pakistani establishment did not want to lose 
their grip on the maliks who time and again reiterated their firm support and 
confidence in Pakistan. By not allowing the political activities in FATA, they were 
probably afraid of the popularity of the Pashtoon nationalist parties, accused of being 
sympathetic to the Afghan cause in the tribal areas, and which, of course, was seen 
as detrimental to the Pakistani interest in the area. The government sources also 
confirmed that FATA was lacking far behind in many ways and no substantial 
change was seen in the economic or social conditions of the area till 1972 when  the 
government decided to give special attention to the neglected sectors including the 
FATA and the ‗role of public sector has been greatly increased‘. During 1972-80 a 
huge amount of money totaling about 1600 million Pakistani Rupees (PKR), i.e. an 
average of about 200 million (PKR) per annum was allocated to the development 
projects in FATA.
25
 Although funds had been allocated to the FATA for 
developments, they have ‗only covered a fraction of the backlog of the past neglect 
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both of pre-independence and post-independence periods‘.26 To improve the social 
and economic conditions of the FATA it suggested the merger of the tribal areas into 
the settled districts of Pashtoonkhwa as, ‗…tribal areas, adjacent to NWFP are in fact 
an economic part of that province and are being treated separately only for political 
reasons. Therefore, its development will have to be integrated with the development 
of North-West Frontier Province‘.27 
 
 
AFGHAN CRISIS’ REPERCUSSIONS ON FATA 
 
All of the seven political agencies except the Orakzai are contiguous to each other 
and borders with Afghanistan along with the Durand Line. The tribesmen belonging 
to Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, North and South Waziristan moved freely 
across the border. They have kinship and matrimonial relations with the Pashtoons 
living on the Afghan side of the border. Except few check posts manned by the 
Pakistan and Afghanistan officials, the crossing of the border at will is an accepted 
norm and continued unchecked since the demarcation of the Durand Line in 1893.  
 
The present crisis in Afghanistan started in April 1978 with the overthrow of 
Sardar Daud regime and the proclamation of Afghanistan as the Peoples Democratic 
Republic of Afghanistan. The new Soviet-sponsored Socialist regime led by Noor 
Mohammad Tarakai announced the modernisation programme aimed at bringing 
drastic changes in the primitive Afghan society. However, the new regime faced 
resistance mainly from the clergy who mobilised the Afghan population against the 
Khalq government. A large number of Afghan refugees crossed the Durand Line and 
entered Pakistan. They were treated as ‗welcome guests‘ by the military regime in 
Pakistan under General Zia ul Haq, who needed some kind of legitimacy for his rule 
after the dismissal of Z. A. Bhutto government in July 1977. He decided to get 
maximum benefit out of it and started providing organisational training to the 
Afghan refugees, termed as the Mujahideen (holy warriors). The USA through the 
CIA, and some countries of Western Europe supported the Zia ul Haq regime by 
providing generously both money and weapons in huge quantity to help topple the 
Soviet-friendly regime in Afghanistan.
28
 The resistance against the Afghan 
government intensified and coupled with some other major issues including the 
factional fighting between pro-Moscow Khalq and Parcham, compelled the Soviet 
authorities to intervene directly into the Afghan affairs. On 27
th
 December 1979, the 
Soviet army crossed the Oxus and occupied Afghanistan. With the Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan the whole region including the tribal areas of Pakistan underwent 
drastic changes.  
 
With Pakistan becoming the front line state, it had to face the results of the 
tussle between the Soviet troops and the Afghan mujahideen first. According to 
Rashid Ahmad, ‗The tribal areas became the training and staging ground of Afghan 
mujahideen, who also used the areas for the purpose of providing medical aid to the 
wounded Afghan fighters. Since war of resistance (jihad) was the top priority, 
everything was subservient to its objectives. The administration, local services, 
including water, pastures, forestry and land were geared towards serving the 
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Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 178. Further details can be seen in the same 
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objectives of jihad‘.29 The presence of millions of Afghan refugees put a great 
pressure on the resources of the tribal areas. It had adversely affected the 
environment and resulted in deforestation at many places. He further says that ‗Since 
the whole area had become a war zone and Pakistan had opened its borders to allow 
Afghan refugees to enter the country and take refuge in Pakistan from the Afghan 
side. Similarly, the mujahideen groups would cross the Pak-afghan border at will. 
The Durand Line had practically ceased to exist with the free movement of people, 
fighters, arms and ammunition across the international border between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. The whole area became heavily armed with heavy weapons supplied by 
the United States to the Afghan mujahideen to fight against the Soviet troops. Under 
the impact of the ongoing jihad, the local administration, which already exercised 
nominal control over the tribal population, was rendered totally ineffective‘.30                                 
 
After the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan, the USA and the West lost 
their interest in the region. The mercenaries and professionals brought and collected 
against the Soviet troops, were abandoned and left in the region, only to pose a 
serious threat. The unchecked movement across the Durand Line continued unabated 
providing a golden opportunity to the then Afghan rulers to establish more contacts 
with the tribesmen on the Pakistani side of the Frontier. During the Taliban regime, 
many Pashtoon tribesmen joined the Taliban army to fight with their political 
opponents. The Arabs and Egyptians were seen as the back bone of the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan. The Saudi billionaire Osama bin Laden and his associates 
became the major financiers of the Taliban government in Afghanistan.  
 
 
THE POST-9/11 DEVELOPMENTS AND FATA  
 
The unfortunate happenings of 9/11 in the USA, the ouster of the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan and the presence of more than one hundred thousand American and 
NATO troops in Afghanistan had a negative impact upon FATA. After the American 
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, many al Qaida leaders, the Taliban and their 
supporters which included Saudis, Egyptians, Yemenis, Uzbeks, Chechens and other 
militants sneaked into the tribal areas of Pakistan. They found the inaccessible 
mountain area as the safe-havens for their future pursuits. Most of them could not 
return to their countries of origin because of their ‗unwanted‘ activities, they 
considered this area as their last abode. 
 
Pakistan‘s military dictator President Pervez Musharraf decided for 
collaboration in the war against terrorism and declared his country‘s support to the 
US and its Allies. However, despite deployment of more than a hundred thousand 
Pakistani troops in the tribal areas and sharing intelligence on the capture and killing 
of al Qaida leaders,
31
 still a trust deficit can be seen on both sides. 
 
The Pakistan army launched its fist military operation in the tribal areas on 
27
th
 June 2002 and since then is fully involved in its fight against the terrorists. It 
used gunship helicopters, heavy artillery and even air force help was sought at 
occasions to bomb the militant‘s hideouts. The US is relying heavily upon its drone 
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technology, introduced recently to target the high-valued militants. In March 2011, 
the military authorities stated that most of the people killed in the drone attacks ‗are 
hard core elements, a sizeable number of them foreigners‘. They gave the number of 
predator strikes as 164 between the years 2007 and 2011 killing more than a 
thousand people. According to their estimate, of those killed 793 were locals and 171 
foreigners including Arabs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens, Filipinos and Moroceans‘.32 
The prominent al Qaida leaders and its sympathisers killed in the drone attacks 
included Baitullah Mahsud (Chief of the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan), Tahir Yuldashev 
(Leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), Abu Zubaydah, Abu Hamza 
Rabia, Haitham al-Yemeni and Abu Mustafa Yazid.
33
               
 
EXTENSION OF POLITICAL PARTIES ORDER TO FATA AND ITS 
IMPACT 
 
To curb the rising tide of militancy in the region, the Government of Pakistan 
allocated huge funds for various developmental projects in the FATA but is still 
facing problems because of the presence of a large number of militants including 
hard core al Qaida and its sympathisers in the area which is hindering all such 
efforts. Although the US and some Western European countries also announced aid 
packages to provide relief to the tribesmen including a US pledge to provide 750 
million US dollars to develop the infrastructure and human resources in the FATA to 
combat militancy,
34
 but unless there is peace and tranquillity in the FATA, these 
announcements are simply a futile exercise. The Pakistani authorities are cognizant 
of the fact that unless major changes are introduced in the FATA, flushing out the 
militancy from the area seems nearly impossible. In this connection, some drastic 
measures have been introduced recently by the present Pakistan government as they 
are optimistic of its success in the tribal areas.  
 
As mentioned earlier, politics of any kind was not permissible in the FATA 
and the tribal areas were governed through special regulations.
35
 The Pakistan 
government continued the same practice for decades and recently introduced some 
major changes involving the whole tribal population. It generated mixed feelings 
among the tribesmen. One such major step is the extension of the Political Parties 
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 One such regulation made mainly to deal with the judicial issues was the Frontier Crimes 
Regulations (FCR) also termed as a ‗Black Law‘ and ‗Draconian Piece of Legislation‘. It was 
enacted in 1872 by the Punjab government and was later on revised slightly in 1887 and 
1901. The FCR empowered the authorities to refer both the criminal and civil cases to the 
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the Political Agents. Sections 21 and 40 of the FCR became notorious and much dreaded and 
the most misused sections of the FCR because they provided for the blockade of hostile tribes 
and  also for the punishment of the whole tribe for a crime committed by a member of that 
tribe, of course, giving no right to appeal. In a civilised society there is no room for such laws 
which provide for detention of an innocent person for the wrong doings of his family 
members. The successive Pakistani regimes retained it as the best tool to control and regulate 
the tribal affairs. Although the Pakistani authorities have recently assured the tribesmen that 
soon they will get rid of the oppressive laws the tribesmen in the FATA, they are still 
governed by the FCR which has been denounced by majority in Pakistan considering it as a 
bitter legacy of the colonialism.                
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Order to the FATA. As argued, the tribal areas are designated as special areas and 
are considered as the direct responsibility of the President of Pakistan who in his turn 
delegated his authority to the Governor. The Constitution of Pakistan authorises the 
President to extend the executive authority of the Federation to the tribal areas. He 
can modify and implement laws in the FATA for the sake of peace and good 
governance.
36
 With few modifications the 1956, 1962 and 1973 Constitutions of 
Pakistan retained the same. To run the affairs smoothly a federal ministry called 
Ministry of State and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) has been formed, which is 
answerable principally to the elected representatives of the nation including the 
Prime Minister and the Parliament but is ‗virtually irrelevant in policy 
implementation or execution in the FATA and acts mainly as a conduit for routing 
federal funds‘.37 The real authority rests with the President, and the Governor 
Pashtoonkhwa exercises it on the behalf of the President. 
 
The adult franchise granted to other parts of Pakistan since its independence in 
1947 was not extended to the FATA obviously for political reasons. Ironically, for 
fifty years they were kept away from constitutional packages introduced in other 
parts of Pakistan. However, in late 1996 the Government of Pakistan decided to 
extend the adult franchise to FATA. Till then the system of limited franchise was en 
vogue in the FATA and only the selected notables and maliks enjoyed the right to 
vote and common man in the tribal areas had no right of franchise. The elections of 
1997 were the first of its kind held in the FATA on the basis of adult franchise 
electing 12 members to the National Assembly of Pakistan. ‗The extension of adult 
franchise in FATA was a long-standing demand of the people of the Tribal Areas‘, 
commented Rashid. ‗But the successive governments of Pakistan had been 
postponing this decision due to their policy of appeasement towards the tribal chiefs 
(Maliks), who feared the loss of their entrenched privileged positions in the areas in 
case method of direct elections was introduced‘. He further stated that ‗No wonder 
the decision was hailed as an event of great historic importance, which changed the 
entire socio-political structure of tribal society‘.38 As FATA was a federal subject, it 
has not been given any representation in the provincial legislature. Despite the 
opposition of the maliks and other allowance holders, the tribesmen demanded that 
since FATA is part of Pakistan why not to consider them as a part in real senses and 
extend all those facilities and rights to FATA which other citizens of Pakistan enjoy 
also.  
 
On 14
th
 August 2009, President Asif Ali Zardari announced the long-awaited 
political, judicial and administrative reforms for the FATA by allowing political 
activities in the tribal areas.
39
  He stated that ‗As we celebrate we should also pause 
and reflect whether and where we are going. Unfortunately, over the years as 
democracy was trampled, an extremist mindset was allowed to grow. I don‘t want to 
go into who nurtured the militants and how they were aided. It is all too well 
known‘. He also elaborated on how the militants were posing a direct threat to 
Pakistan because they want to smash the whole fabric of the society. ‗They want to 
impose their political and ideological agenda on the people of Pakistan through force 
and coercion. They reject the state, the Constitution, democracy and, indeed, our way 
of life‘. He appealed the nation to help the government in crushing the militancy for 
the sake of the country, democracy, institutions and way of life.
40
 Farhatullah Babar, 
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the presidential spokesman, regarded this as a gift to the Pakistani nation on its 62
nd
 
Independence Day and stated that the powers of arbitrary arrest and detention 
without following the legal procedure have been prohibited. He particularly 
mentioned the draconian law FCR ‗under which there was no provision of appeal, 
wakeel or daleel (lawyer or reasoning) against the orders of the executive‘ and which 
was amended keeping in view the aspirations of the majority people of FATA.
41
 In 
the reform package, announced by the President, the political parties order of 2002 
was extended to the FATA and changes to the notorious FCR were introduced. 
Under the new package of the tribesmen under trial were now given a right to appeal 
and women and children under 16 were excluded from the territorial responsibility 
clause of the FCR. Another major break up was bringing the hitherto unchecked 
accounts of the political agents for audit to be conducted by the auditor general.  
 
Hailing the extension of PPO 2002 to the FATA and by making major 
changes in the FCR, Rashid Ahmed opined that the reforms announced by the 
Pakistani president ‗would go a long way in fulfilling the aspirations of the people of 
the tribal areas for emancipation and usher in a new era of political and social 
development‘. According to him ‗it will further marginalise the militants, who have 
already been badly mauled by the military operations in Swat and other districts of 
Malakand Division. The reforms would weaken the sway held by the militants over 
the tribal areas through a reign of terror and intimidation. The reforms offer a 
historic opportunity to the tribal people to become the masters of their own fate 
instead of resigning it to the wills and whims of the militants as the case is today‘.42 
Civil Society organisations and NGO‘s also supported the government move. The 
National Democratic Institute, with Sandra Houston as the country head for Pakistan, 
appreciated the announcement and volunteered their services in facilitating the 
government for strengthening the democratic institutions in the country.
43
 Through 
group discussions and party meetings the NDI succeeded in developing a consensus 
amongst the various groups and political parties including ANP, PPP, PML-N, PML-
Q, JI, JUI-F, PPP-S, PMAP, NP and MQM to one agenda i.e. full support for the 
special economic package for the FATA to remove its backwardness and to bring it 
at par with other developed areas of Pakistan.
44
    
 
However, to the utter chagrin of many, despite developing consensus among 
the major political parties and some other stake-holders in the FATA, the matter was 
delayed for unknown reasons. The tribesmen expressed their abhorrence over the 
delay and blamed some
45
 circles in the government of Pakistan for the lethargic 
attitude towards a very important issue. They were convinced that allowing political 
parties to extend their organisations in the region ‗will provide the masses 
alternatives to the dominance of mullahs, who in the absence of political 
representation and leadership control the population through mosque and pulpit. It 
would also allow the region to develop a new generation of political leaders and 
reduce the impact of the hereditary tribal elders who currently dominate politics in 
the FATA‘. They were perturbed that despite a popular desire in the FATA to 
integrate the tribal areas fully in Pakistan, the government was putting the matter in 
the cold storage and not fulfilling its promises. They lamented that the ‗issue was 
again buried beneath judicial, political, economic, energy and security crises jolting 
Islamabad, and the government chose inaction over embarking upon drastic changes 
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in the governance of the tribal regions‘. They also complained that ‗though the 
package offered a ray of hope for tribesmen mired in conflict and poverty, the 
government has not so far hinted at actual implementation, much to the chagrin of 
many tribesmen‘.46     
 
Eventually, on 12
th
 August 2011, in the presence of FATA Parliamentarians, 
President Zardari signed two important regulations namely the Extension of the 
Political parties Order 2000 to the Tribal Areas and Amendments in the FCR called 
the Frontier Crimes (Amendments) Regulation, 2011.
47
 Under the presidential 
regulations the political parties are allowed to operate fully and present their party 
manifestos carrying their socio-economic programmes in the tribal areas. The ‗black 
law‘ of the colonial era has been amended drastically for the benefit of the general 
population of the FATA. In extending the PPO to the FATA, the government 
believed that they would counter the rising tide of the militancy and the ‗pernicious 
one-sided campaign of militants to impose their ideological agenda on the people‘.48  
Noorul Haq Qadri, a FATA parliamentarian from the Khyber Agency, also shared 
the same opinion. Commenting on the implementation of the new FATA regulations 
he said that the ‗historic decision will also help in containing growing trend of 
militancy in the region‘ and would also provide a platform to the educated tribal 
youth to participate in the positive political activities.
49
  According to some political 
observers this will also help the political parties to field their own candidates in the 
next general elections in Pakistan due in 2013. Moreover, it will help in getting rid of 
the many corrupt practices en vogue in the FATA including the horse trading, 
synonymous to the FATA parliamentarians. The Governor Pashtoonkhwa also 
regarded the FATA reforms as a major positive step in bringing the turbulent tribal 
area into the main stream of Pakistan national politics. ‗To the outside world the 
FATA is a centre of gravity of militancy‘, he stated, ‗but by implementing the 
reforms we will convert the tribal areas into a heavens of peace and prosperity‘, he 
remarked.
50
 The majority of people in Pakistan are optimistic that the new laws 
would eliminate terrorism from the tribal areas and are hopeful that by the extension 
of the new regulations the FATA would usher in a new era of development and 
progress. The tribesmen will be sharing more responsibility and confidence in the 
political system of the country, thus help strengthen the ongoing struggle for keeping 
democratic institutions and system in high esteem. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Hidden away in lofty mountains and inhospitable and inaccessible valleys, the tribal 
areas of Pakistan came to the lime light recently. In the aftermath of the American 
invasion of Afghanistan, the rising tide of the militancy, the presence of a big 
number of al Qaida, Taliban and their supporters in the area, the deployment of more 
than one hundred thousand Pakistani troops in tribal territory and use of the latest 
technology like the drone attacks on the insurgents are some of the causes of the 
attraction of the world attention towards FATA. The area has been virtually turned 
into a battle ground in the war upon terrorism and more recently it has become the 
main topic of discussion in the daily changing Pakistan-US relations.      
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In the Colonialist‘s discourse, this area, termed as ‗Yaghistan’ (no man land), 
‗Ilaqa Ghair’ (the area under no law), and ‗Qabaili Ilaqa’ (tribal territory), was kept 
as a buffer zone between Afghanistan and the settled areas of British India. To 
ensure the security of its outposts and also to protect its citizens from the tribal 
incursions, the British Indian government adopted various steps towards the 
Pashtoon tribesmen. However, to keep the tribes under control and also to guard the 
frontiers of British India, punitive expeditions were despatched against the 
recalcitrant tribes and military posts were made deep inside the tribal territory. The 
tribes resisted the raj and opposed the British presence in the area with full vigour 
and all available means. From the British occupation of the Punjab in 1849 till the 
partition of India in 1947, more than eighty major expeditions were undertaken to 
subdue the Frontier tribes but with little success. The British Indian government 
faced formidable resistance in the tribal areas and the locals expressed their weird 
stubbornness during all this time. 
 
Pakistan got control of the tribal areas as a successive state after the British 
withdrawal from South Asia. Due to its strategic importance and probably for the 
smooth running of the lose administration in the area, the Pakistan government 
retained the old Maliki system in FATA. The reforms introduced in other parts of the 
country, including the Political Parties Act of 1962 (reformulated in 2002 as Political 
Parties Order), were denied to the tribal areas of Pakistan for obvious reasons. But 
the crisis in Afghanistan changed the whole scenario and the area underwent drastic 
changes. The long porous Pak-Afghan border provided an opportunity to the 
Afghans in large numbers to cross it at their own will. Through the connivance of the 
CIA and the Pakistani establishment, they were trained, organised and sent back to 
Afghanistan to topple the Afghan regime. This involved the local tribesmen in the 
proxy war and the Afghan affairs to the extent that presently both Pakistan and 
Afghan governments failed to convince them to stop their support to jihadis against 
the established authorities. Since there was no effective control from either side, 
after the heavy bombing of Tora Bora in the winter of 2001-2002, many Taliban and 
al Qaida operators crossed the Pak-Afghan border and entered the tribal areas. These 
‗unwelcome‘ guests high-jacked the traditional tribal society and introduced a jihadi 
mindset in the region. The influential and prominent Pashtoon tribal elders, who 
were opposed to the outside interference and the presence of militants in the region, 
were killed mysteriously. The whole fabric of the Pashtoon society was disturbed. 
The al Qaida took advantage of the prevalent chaos and recruited a large number of 
unemployed tribesmen for its future operations. The newly-recruited trained 
mercenaries cross the Pak-Afghan border without any hindrance, attack the US and 
NATO troops stationed in Afghanistan and are inflicting heavy losses upon them. 
The cross-border infiltration continues unabated and resulted in soaring relations 
between Pakistan and the USA. The US authorities, although acknowledging in the 
same breath the sacrifices rendered by Pakistanis as more than the US itself in the 
war upon terror, are demanding to prevent attacks against the US and its Allies in 
Afghanistan. The US officials accused the intelligence agencies of Pakistan of 
providing the covert support to the insurgents, particularly the Haqqanis. In a recent 
statement, released by the State Department, Secretary Hillary Clinton 
acknowledged the sacrifices of the Pakistani people in these words: ‗And I think it is 
important to remind ourselves that Pakistanis have paid a much greater price in the 
war against terrorism and in the violence perpetrated on them over the last 10 years 
than, thankfully we have‘, she noted. ‗Nearly 30,000 people have been killed — 
civilians and military, scores of bombing attacks all over the country in places from 
mosques to markets to universities to police stations‘. While elaborating on the issue 
of the alleged covert Pakistani support to the Haqqanis she stated that ‗If you go on 
You Tube, you can see Sirajuddin Haqqani with President Reagan at the White 
House‘, because the US through the CIA was then providing full support to the 
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Afghan jihadis against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. ‗So when I meet for many 
hours, as I do, with Pakistani officials, they rightly say ―You‘re the ones who told us 
to cooperate with these people. You‘re the ones who funded them. You‘re the ones 
who equipped them. You‘re the ones who used to bring down the Soviet Union by 
driving them out of Afghanistan. And we are now both in a situation that is highly 
complex and difficult to extricate ourselves from‖. That is how they see it‘.51 The 
Pakistanis, however, blame the US and are complaining that ‗whenever the US 
wants Pakistan to extend war on terror, it makes promises and then forgets after the 
objective is achieved‘.52 The US authorities, though, firmly believe that the Haqqanis 
have their safe ‗havens‘ in Pakistan and are using these hideouts for attacking US, 
NATO and the Afghan troops inside Afghanistan but are convinced that ‗there is no 
solution in the region without Pakistan and no stable future in the region without 
partnership‘. She emphasized the need that US should enter into negotiations with 
the Haqqanis but at the same time should continue to work with Pakistan to destroy 
the shelters and safe houses of the Haqqanis in the FATA.
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The extension of the PPO (2002) to the tribal areas and the major 
changes/amendments in the centuries old oppressive law, the FCR, are positive steps 
in the right direction. However, still there are some other basic issues which need to 
be tackled very carefully. To curtail the influence of the al Qaida and the like-
minded, it is imperative to revamp the whole infrastructure of the tribal society. The 
first priority should be given to imparting free education, followed by major reforms 
in health, developments in the field of agriculture, revival of the industries and 
improvement in the communication system of the whole tribal region. Although the 
extension of the new regulations is a major breakthrough in the centuries old rotten 
tribal system, still it needs more developmental packages. In addition, by imparting 
technical and vocational training to the unemployed youth would enable the 
Pakistani authorities to grab them back from the militant. Since they have no 
resources for subsistence in the area, the tribesmen are always dependent upon the 
outside world.
54
 If the government provides job opportunities in their own areas, they 
definitely will not be attracted by the al Qaida and the Taliban and would become 
law abiding citizens of the country.  
 
The recent increase in the death of many innocent tribesmen in the drone 
attacks increased the anti-American feelings in the area to many folds. The drone 
strategy should be revised henceforth with and steps should be taken to deal with the 
targets more precisely to avoid further civilian losses and not risking the lives of 
many innocent tribesmen furthermore. The blame game between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan should be immediately stopped because this is benefitting the militants 
enormously. In order to flush out the militants from the tribal areas of Pakistan, 
modern techniques of surveillance should be adopted and distinction should be made 
between the locals and the foreigners. The authorities on both sides of the Durand 
Line should work upon a joint plan to negotiate with the local militants and try to 
convince them to renounce militancy and severe their links with the international 
terrorists. Once they surrender to the local authorities, they should be integrated in 
the newly political system and this would certainly improve the situation and will 
bring peace, stability and rule of law to the tribal areas of Pakistan and help them 
fully to participate in the future electoral politics of the country ensuring the 
strengthening of the democratic institutions in Pakistan. 
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